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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
In a 2007 decision, the United States Supreme Court struck down school 
integration plans in Louisville and Seattle.  The Court held that it violates the 
constitutional principle of equal treatment for state governments to assign 
students, or block their requested school transfers, based on the race of individual 
students or the racial percentages in the student population.  Those state policies 
had been challenged by parents who were upset that their children had been 
denied the ability to go to a preferred public school.    
Due to that Supreme Court decision, one of the most controversial decisions 
facing the Arkansas General Assembly during the upcoming session is how to 
modify the Arkansas Public School Choice Act,1 as well as the Arkansas 
Opportunity Public School Choice Act of 2004.2  These school choice provisions 
affect numerous Arkansas students.  In the 2007-08 year, a total of 2,623 students 
in Arkansas successfully sought a transfer to another district, including 298 black 
students and 75 Hispanic students.  As we understand from a conversation with 
staff at the Arkansas Department of Education, close to half of Arkansas’ schools 
are involved in public school choice, whether sending or receiving transfer 
students.   
As Representative Johnny Hoyt recently said, “Anytime you have the Supreme 
Court making a ruling that raises question about a state law, you have to take 
another look at it.”  In addition, a pending lawsuit argues that the school choice 
law unconstitutionally makes race a sole factor in determining if a student is able 
to transfer.  Whether or not that particular lawsuit succeeds, both Acts are 
susceptible to a legal challenge: just as in Louisville and Seattle, Arkansas public 
school students can be barred from transferring to another school district based on 
the student’s own race and the racial percentages in the district.  The General 
Assembly must therefore modify those legal provisions.    
This does not mean that the General Assembly faces a stark choice between 
eliminating public school choice altogether vs. allowing unlimited choice.  Nor 
does it mean that racial considerations are entirely out of bounds.  Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence — which provided the fifth and controlling vote — 
suggested that even if states may not block student transfers based on race, states 
may still try to encourage racial diversity by methods “including strategic site 
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of 
the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; 
                                                 
1
 Ark. Laws § 6-18-206. 
2
 Ark. Laws § 6-18-227. 
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recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race.”  To the extent the Assembly wishes to 
pursue racial diversity, it should consider policies of that sort.   
As a specific example of the sorts of measures that are still allowed, numerous 
school districts nationwide — including Seattle and Louisville themselves — 
have moved towards the pursuit of socio-economic integration, rather than racial 
integration per se.  Such plans may afford at least some low-income students the 
opportunity not to be trapped in a poor performing school.  In addition, it would 
presumably be constitutional for the Assembly to bar transfers out of districts 
where such transfers would undermine socio-economic integration.   
Finally, any benefits of integration (whether racial or socio-economic) are usually 
due to improvements in the schools themselves, such as better teachers or higher 
expectations.  The Arkansas General Assembly may wish to consider policies that 
would improve teacher and school quality across the board, which would benefit 
all students rather than the few who seek transfers. 
In the following Policy Brief, we first describe the workings of the Arkansas 
public school choice laws.  Next, we briefly analyze the evidence in support of 
racial integration in education.  We then describe in detail the Supreme Court’s 
ruling.  The concluding section then points to several possible actions that the 
General Assembly might take.  
  
  
A R K A N S A S ’  C U R R E N T  P U B L I C  
S C H O O L  C H O I C E  L A W  
There are two main sources of public school choice 
that we have identified as relevant: the Arkansas 
Public School Choice Act of 1989, and the Arkansas 
Opportunity  Public School Choice Act of 2004 (part 
of Act 35), the latter of which is relevant because it 
incorporates the racial conditions from the former.  
The federal No Child Left Behind act (NCLB) 
similarly requires that states allow students to 
transfer out of public  schools that fail to achieve 
adequate yearly progress for two or more years.  To 
the best that we can ascertain,  Arkansas has not 
attempted to impose any racial conditions on such 
NCLB transfers; if our assumption is incorrect,  the 
analysis in this Policy Brief would apply to such 
conditions as well.   
Public school choice in Arkansas began with the 
“Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989,” or 
the “Act.” At the outset of that Act, the Arkansas 
General Assembly declared its belief that students 
and their parents should be “provided greater 
freedom to determine the most effective school for 
meeting their individual educational needs,” and that 
increased competition would lead to “enhanced 
quality and effectiveness” because of the “added 
incentive” for school boards and teachers to “satisfy 
the educational needs of the students who reside in 
the district.”   
In service of those goals, the General Assembly 
established a system that allows “any student to 
attend a school in a district in which the student does 
not reside.”3  The Arkansas General Assembly has 
reiterated its commitment to freedom of choice since 
that time: before 2003, local school boards could 
refuse to admit students who lived in another 
district, but then the General Assembly modified the 
law to require that all schools participate in the 
public school choice program, noting that public 
school choice is “one of the methods for  providing 
equal opportunity” to students.4   
The right to exercise public school choice is not, 
however, unfettered.  Due to concerns that public 
                                                 
3
 Ark. Laws § 6-18-206(a).   
4
 2003 Ark. Acts 1272 at § 2. 
school choice might be used to undermine racial 
integration, the Arkansas General Assembly 
included subsection (f)(1), by which a student is not 
allowed to transfer to a district that has a higher 
percentage of students that belong to the same race 
as the student.  For example, if a white student in a 
60% white district sought to transfer to a district that 
was 65% white, the transfer would not be allowed 
under the Arkansas public school choice law.  
The racial restriction comes with a few exceptions.  
First, if the student is seeking to transfer to another 
district in the same county and if the percentages of 
minority and majority races in both districts are 
“within an acceptable range,” then the transfer may 
be allowed.  The “acceptable range” of racial 
percentages is defined on a yearly basis by the 
Arkansas Department of Education based on the 
population in every county, and the Act directs the 
education department to establish guidelines 
allowing the percentage of minority or majority 
students to differ by one-fourth from the county’s 
racial balance.  Thus, in the example from the 
previous paragraph, if the percentage of blacks and 
whites in both school districts was within the range 
defined by the Arkansas Department of Education, a 
white student might indeed be allowed to transfer 
from the 60% white district to the 65% white 
district.     
Second, school transfers may be allowed if each 
school district lacks a “critical mass of minority 
percentage in the student’s race of more than ten 
percent (10%) of any single race.”  Although 
inartfully drafted, this provision apparently means 
that a black student could be allowed to transfer 
from an 8% black district to a 9% black district.   
Third, under subsection f(4), the racial integration 
restriction must give way to any court-ordered 
desegregation plan.   
The Arkansas Opportunity Public School Choice Act 
of 2004 allows students to transfer out of any public 
school that has been deemed failing for two or more 
years.5  That school choice law is relevant here 
because it has a subsection that makes all transfers 
                                                 
5
 Ark. Laws § 6-18-227(b)(1)(A).   
  
subject to the racial provision in the Arkansas Public 
School Choice Act of 1989.6   
Although no centralized statistics are kept regarding 
the number of students denied a transfer based on 
race, the Arkansas Department of Education does 
receive complaints about such denials.  In late 
October, a Hot Springs attorney filed a lawsuit on 
behalf of parents in Malvern, alleging that the 
Arkansas school choice act is unconstitutional in 
making race the only factor that determines whether 
a student can transfer.  While a magistrate judge has 
currently recommended a finding that the parents in 
that case lack standing, another lawsuit could easily 
be brought by parents who do have standing.   
R E A S O N S  F O R  P U R S U I N G  
I N T E G R A T I O N  
Supporters of racial integration have pointed to a 
wide range of possible benefits.  For example, one 
study found that desegregation resulted in a black 
dropout rate that was 2-3% lower,7 while other 
studies have suggested that black students who 
attend integrated schools are more likely to attain 
success in integrated universities and work settings,8 
including modestly higher incomes.9  White students 
who interact with children of other races may show 
less racial prejudice as adults.10  In addition, 
desegregation might equalize the availability of 
high-quality teachers, given that inner-city schools 
with high concentrations of minority students often 
have trouble attracting or retaining such teachers.11  
As for academic achievement, the evidence is rather 
thin.  One noted analysis found that desegregation 
did not affect math achievement, and raised reading 
achievement by only about two-to-six weeks’ worth 
of instruction.12  Another comprehensive analysis of 
                                                 
6
 Ark. Laws § 6-18-227(e) (“The provisions of this section and 
all student choice options created in this section are subject to 
the limitations of § 6-18-206(d)-(f).”).     
7
 Guryan 2004. 
8
 Crain and Strauss 1985. 
9
 Ashenfelter, Collins and Yoon 2005. 
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 Wood and Sonleitner 1996; APA Brief 2006. 
11
 Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2004. 
12
 Cook 1984. 
over 250 desegregation studies found that 
“desegregation has had some positive impact on the 
reading skills of African American youngsters.  The 
effect is not large, nor does it occur in all situations, 
but a modest measurable effect does seem apparent.  
Such is not the case with mathematics skills, which 
seem generally unaffected by desegregation.”13   
In any event, the main purpose of integration is to 
bring the benefits of well-funded schools to 
disadvantaged populations.   
T H E  S U P R E M E  C O U R T ’ S  
R E S T R I C T I O N  O N  S T A T E  A N D  L O C A L  
I N T E G R A T I O N  E F F O R T S  
Insofar as the Arkansas public school choice law 
restricts freedom of choice based on racial 
percentages and a given student’s race, the recent 
lawsuit filed in Malvern has a strong likelihood of 
succeeding, based on a recent decision from the 
United States Supreme Court.  In Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1 (2007), the Supreme Court struck down integration 
plans in both Seattle and Louisville.14  As the 
following description will show, the Seattle and 
Louisville plans were substantively similar to the 
Arkansas public school choice law, in that they too 
limited public school choice based on the racial 
identity of the student and the racial composition of 
the affected schools.   
In Seattle, the city’s integration plan allowed ninth 
graders to choose any of the district’s high schools.  
If a given high school was oversubscribed, the 
district would then need to choose which students 
would receive their first choice, and which students 
would be sent to a second or third choice school.  
One of the tiebreakers was whether the school was 
within 10 percentage points of the balance of white 
and nonwhite students in the population.  In other 
words, if the school was more than 10 percentage 
points away from racial balance, students would be 
chosen to attend that school based on whether their 
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 Schofield 1995. 
14
 The Seattle and Louisville plans concerned transfers within 
the same district, whereas Arkansas’ law is a state-wide law 
concerning inter-district transfers.  That distinction has no 
bearing on the legal analysis, given that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning would apply in both settings.   
  
race would aid in bringing the school to the right 
racial balance.  The plaintiff in the Seattle case was a 
white student who had been denied admission to his 
preferred school because of the racial tiebreaker.   
In Louisville, all non-magnet schools were required 
to have a minimum black enrollment of 15 percent 
and a maximum of 50 percent.  Parents of 
kindergarteners or first-graders (or parents new to 
the district) were allowed to submit their first and 
second choices for schools, but their children could 
be denied attendance at a chosen school if the child’s 
race would put the school out of the racial 
percentage guidelines (for example, if the school 
would have too many or too few blacks).  All 
students were also permitted to seek a transfer to 
another school, but a transfer could be denied due to 
the racial guidelines.  In the Louisville case, the 
plaintiff was a mother whose son had been denied 
admission to a school a mile from home due to the 
racial guidelines, and had instead been assigned to a 
school ten miles away.  
The Seattle case was a 5-4 decision, but the 5 votes 
to strike down the Seattle and Louisville school 
choice plans were divided: 4 votes joined an opinion 
by Chief Justice Roberts, while Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote a separate and narrower concurrence.  
We will describe both opinions, although Justice 
Kennedy’s separate concurrence is more significant, 
because he provided the fifth and crucial vote.  
In considering the racial integration plans in Seattle 
and Louisville, the Supreme Court applied “strict 
scrutiny,” a constitutional doctrine requiring that 
when the government classifies people by race (even 
with a benign intent), it must be doing so in a way 
that is “narrowly tailored” to a “compelling interest.”  
“Narrowly tailored” means that the racial 
classification cannot sweep any more broadly than is 
truly necessary, and a “compelling interest” means 
that the government must have a truly important 
reason for using the racial classification in the first 
place.   
Strict scrutiny is a difficult and almost 
insurmountable test to meet.  The 4-vote opinion by 
Chief Justice Robert held that the only relevant 
“compelling” governmental interest would be 
“remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination.”  That compelling interest was not 
present, however, given that Seattle never had a 
history of intentional racial segregation in the first 
place, and Louisville had been released from a 
desegregation order in 2000.  Thus, any “continued 
use of race must be justified on some other basis.”   
The 4-vote opinion then rejected the claim that state 
governments can pursue racial “diversity” as a 
compelling interest.  The opinion noted that a 
previous Supreme Court decision (regarding the 
Michigan university system) had allowed the pursuit 
of racial diversity only in the university context, and 
only because the universities were using race as part 
of focusing on each applicant “as an individual,” 
rather than rejecting a few students solely on the 
basis of their race.   
In addition, the Seattle and Louisville plans were 
tied to “each district’s specific racial demographics,” 
not to any evidence about the level of diversity 
needed to obtain any “educational benefits.”  Thus, it 
was clear that the school districts were pursuing 
“racial balance” for its own sake, and seeking mere 
racial balance does not count as a “compelling” 
governmental interest.  Otherwise, the government 
could perpetually classify people by race throughout 
a wide range of programs.  Moreover, the school 
districts failed to show that that they had “considered 
methods other than explicit racial classifications.”  
Importantly, the Supreme Court noted that relatively 
few students were affected: In Seattle, the racial 
tiebreaker caused only 52 students to be assigned to 
a school that they had not listed as a preference, and 
in Louisville, elementary students were given their 
first or second choice 95 percent of the time.  Still, 
the Supreme Court noted, the very fact that so few 
students were affected cast doubt on the school 
districts’ claims that they needed to assign students 
by race in order to achieve some broad societal goal.   
Justice Kennedy’s narrower concurrence — which is 
what will apply if anyone were to file a lawsuit 
against Arkansas’ school choice act — disagreed 
with the other four Justices on the diversity issue.  In 
Justice Kennedy’s view, it is indeed “permissible to 
consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt 
general policies to encourage a diverse student 
body.”   
  
Thus, schools are allowed to pursue other ways of 
bringing the races together, “including strategic site 
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones 
with general recognition of the demographics of 
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special 
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race.”  While 
such governmental actions could still be considered 
“race conscious,” they do not “lead to different 
treatment based on a classification that tells each 
student he or she is to be defined by race.”  
The problem that Justice Kennedy saw with the 
Seattle and Louisville plans, however, was precisely 
that they used a “crude system of individual racial 
classifications” to tell students whether or not they 
would be able to attend a chosen school.  Kennedy 
added that “crude measures of this sort threaten to 
reduce children to racial chits valued and traded 
according to one school’s supply and another’s 
demand,” and that “to be forced to live under a state-
mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity 
of individuals in our society.”  He reiterated that 
“race-conscious measures that do not rely on 
differential treatment based on individual 
classifications present these problems to a lesser 
degree.”   
A  P A T H  F O R W A R D :  H O W  S H O U L D  
A R K A N S A S  A M E N D  I T S  P U B L I C  
S C H O O L  C H O I C E  L A W ?  
As should be clear, there are striking similarities 
between the racial integration section in the 
Arkansas public school choice law, and the Seattle 
and Louisville integration plans that the Supreme 
Court struck down as in violation of the 
Constitution’s guarantee that the government must 
treat everyone equally.   
Like the city-wide plans in Seattle and Louisville, 
the Arkansas law arguably looks like a “crude 
system of individual racial classifications” (to quote 
Justice Kennedy), because all school transfer 
requests are considered by looking at the student’s 
race, the percentage of that student’s race in his 
home school district, and the percent of that 
student’s race in the new school district to which he 
or she is seeking a transfer.   
Like the plans in Seattle and Louisville, the 
Arkansas law is directly based on “each district’s 
specific racial demographics,” rather than being 
based on any studies or other evidence about the 
level of diversity needed to obtain any “educational 
benefits.”  The law deems certain school transfers to 
be out of bounds simply because the racial 
percentages fail to match up.  Thus, to quote Justice 
Kennedy, the Arkansas law could be said to “reduce 
children to racial chits valued and traded according 
to one school’s supply and another’s demand.” 
Finally, just like Seattle and Louisville, Arkansas 
cannot point to a court-ordered desegregation plan 
that would require a state-wide law “remedying the 
effects of past intentional discrimination.”  Most of 
the towns and cities in Arkansas have never been 
subject to a desegregation order in the first place.  
Even Little Rock — which has been long associated 
with the infamous standoff at Central High School in 
1957 — was released by a federal court from any 
further desegregation obligations as of 2007.  Nor 
would it be availing for the General Assembly to 
adopt a finding that the entire state is in need of 
desegregation (as has been argued in the Malvern 
case); it is quite unrealistic to suppose that the 
Seattle case would have come out differently had the 
Kentucky or Washington legislatures adopted such a 
finding.   
For all these reasons, the Arkansas school choice law 
— as it currently stands — would likely be struck 
down if reviewed by a court.   Indeed, a federal court 
in Arizona struck down a similar plan based on the 
Supreme Court’s Seattle decision.15  Thus, the 
Arkansas General Assembly should remove any text 
in subsection (f)(1) suggesting that school transfers 
can be awarded or denied based on whether the 
student’s race matches a set of pre-determined racial 
percentages drawn up by the state Department of 
Education.  It is fairly clear that this approach is 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
There are several possibilities as to what the General 
Assembly could do next.  First, the General 
Assembly could simply remove public school choice 
altogether.  We think, however, that such an 
approach would be imprudent: it would adversely 
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 Schulte 2007 
  
affect some 2,500 students per year (some of whom 
are minorities themselves).  Moreover, eliminating 
choice would undermine the increased competition 
brought by student choice, and would therefore 
contradict the Assembly’s previous finding that such 
competition creates “enhanced quality and 
effectiveness” because of the “added incentive” for 
school boards and teachers to “satisfy the 
educational needs of the students who reside in the 
district.”  In addition, eliminating choice could have 
unintended ramifications; for example, if a smaller 
school district has to reject all transfers, that district 
might be pushed under the 350-student margin, and 
would therefore be eliminated as a separate district.  
Second, at the opposite extreme, the General 
Assembly could expand public school choice such 
that any student is entitled to transfer to any other 
district.  Although the Assembly could certainly go 
in this direction, it may be concerned about certain 
districts in Arkansas where white flight would be 
encouraged by such unlimited opportunity to transfer 
into other districts.16   
Third, keep in mind that Justice Kennedy provided 
the fifth and controlling vote in the Seattle case, and 
his narrower opinion noted that states may still adopt 
race-conscious measures of the following sort: 
“strategic site selection of new schools; drawing 
attendance zones with general recognition of the 
 demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students 
 and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking 
enrollments, performance, and other statistics by 
 race.”   
Thus, if the Arkansas General Assembly believes 
that some sort of race-conscious measure is still 
necessary to prevent public school choice from 
undermining racial integration, the Assembly should 
consider additional legislation of the sort that Justice 
Kennedy listed.  As a lawyer who defended the 
Seattle program has noted, “districts will find it 
easier to defend an integration plan that uses race-
neutral means.  These include school choice plans, 
                                                 
16
 Although it is possible that an Arkansas resident could file a 
lawsuit claiming that an unfettered public school choice law 
contributed to desegregation, such a lawsuit would have to 
prove that the General Assembly acted with discriminatory 
intent.  Such a showing is unlikely to occur.   
attendance zones, and magnet or focus schools that 
consider socioeconomic status, parents’ level of 
education, geography, concentrated poverty, home 
language, test scores, and other academic 
achievement data.”  (Schulte 2007).   
Such legislation would not need to be part of the 
school choice law itself.  The establishment of 
magnet schools, for example, is not relevant to the 
question whether any individual student can seek a 
transfer, and such programs could be more suitably 
established in a separate law.   
Moreover, as we read the Seattle decision, a 
preference for socio-economic integration would still 
be allowed.  As a New York Times article reported 
this summer, both Seattle and Louisville, as well as 
several other school districts around the country, 
have “announced a switch to class-based 
integration.”  As Richard Kahlenberg notes, “Today, 
roughly forty districts, educating 2.5 million 
students, in ‘red’ states and ‘blue’ states across the 
country, are known to look at family income as a 
way to assign students.”17 
Indeed, some recent research has suggested that 
socio-economic desegregation could have academic 
benefits.  One pair of researchers, looking at 
nationwide data, estimated that the average black 
student’s achievement “would increase by 2 points, 
or about 1 full year of learning,” if he or she 
transferred to a school where the student body was 
“affluent.”18  As Kahlenberg argues, the “best thing 
going for socioeconomic integration politically is 
that it works educationally, raising the academic 
achievement of low-income students while 
maintaining high levels of achievement for middle-
class children.”  Indeed, although socio-economic 
integration does not completely replicate racial 
integration, “research finds that socioeconomic 
school integration is a more powerful lever for 
raising academic achievement than racial integration 
per se.”19   
Thus, the Arkansas General Assembly might 
consider modifying the public school choice law to 
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 Kahlenberg 2007 at 3. 
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 Rumberger and Palardy 2005. 
19
 Kahlenberg 2007 at 5, 7.   
  
include a preference for school transfers that 
increase socio-economic integration — whether 
because a rich student is seeking to transfer into a 
poorer district, or because an impoverished student 
is seeking to transfer into a richer district.   
Fourth, socio-economic integration can only go so 
far, for the simple reason that if too many poor 
children transferred to an “affluent” school, that 
school would no longer be affluent in the first place, 
but would now have a poorer student body.  Thus, 
the Arkansas General Assembly could consider 
measures to improve low-income schools so that 
they have more of the characteristics of high income 
schools, regardless of who transfers to where. 
For example, in the study mentioned above, the 
researchers found that most of the benefits of 
attending a high-income school boil down to four 
factors: “Teachers’ expectations about students’ 
ability to learn; the average hours of homework that 
students completed per week; the average number of 
advanced (college prep) courses taken by students in 
the school; [and] the percentage of students who 
reported feeling unsafe at school.”  But, as 
Kahlenberg notes, “teachers in middle-class schools 
are more likely to be licensed, to be teaching in their 
field of expertise, to have high teacher test scores, to 
have greater teaching experience, and to have more 
formal education.”20 
Thus, school districts around the country are 
considering how to bring these benefits —physical 
safety, good teachers, high expectations — in all 
schools for all students, rather than just for the few 
who are able to transfer into a richer school district 
elsewhere.  For one example, the St. Petersburg, 
Florida district is considering “significantly smaller 
class sizes, longer school days and bonus pay for 
teachers at [high-risk] schools.”21   
The Arkansas General Assembly might usefully 
consider adopting similar measures for high-risk 
schools in Arkansas.  Indeed, such measures — 
which could be considered among the “special 
programs” that Justice Kennedy mentioned — might 
provide an incentive that would ultimately boost or 
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 Kahlenberg 2007 at 7.   
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 Tobin 2008.   
preserve racial integration by creating an incentive 
for higher-income students not to transfer out of 
those schools.   
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